Pure existentials, on the other hand, are more restricted: They do not allow reference to one particular situation. Either, they express existence as such, or permanent presence at a rather large location (a kind of 'habitat' reading). But they cannot denote temporary or accidental presence at a certain location. The point is illustrated by contrasting Standard German (Ge) es gibt 'it gives' with es hot 'it has', which is used in Alemannic dialects (Ale, the example is taken from a dialect spoken in Vorarlberg, Austria):
(2) Ge a.
Es gibt (viele) Pferde in Kanada. it gives (many) horses in Canada "There are (many) horses in Canada." Ge b. * Es gibt (viele) Pferde vor dem Haus.
it gives (many) horses in front of the house (target = c.) Ale c.
Voram Hus hot's Rössr. in-front-of-the house has-it horses "There are horses in front of the house."
Considering the examples in studies by Freeze (1992) and Heine (1997) , it seems that haveexistentials (e.g. French il y a, Spanish hay, Croatian and Bulgarian ima) generally belong to the 'locative existential' group. I take this uniformity across languages to be suggestive: The difference between locative and pure existentials is argued to derive from the argument structures of the verbs involved. According to Heine (1997) , there is evidence for a diachronic relation between possessive 'have' and impersonal existential 'have'. There is also evidence that impersonal geben 'give' has developed from its agentive ditransitive counterpart; cf. Newman (1998) . I argue that the impersonal construction is a result of external argument absorption by a non-referential pronoun:
The target of this absorption is the possessor argument in case of 'have', and the agent/cause argument in case of 'give'. As part of this process, the construction becomes stative (see Kratzer 1994 for a proposal which relates voice, Aktionsarten and external arguments). Like in German (2b), the pure existential in (4b) does not allow existential quantification over a particular situation. This description is reminiscent of the individual-level/stage-level distinction; cf. Carlson (1977) , Kratzer (1989/95 ). I will show that pure existentials behave like individual-level predicates. This property is related to the argument structure changes in (3): The fact that pure existentials do not allow to refer to a particular situation is captured by generic quantification over situations. Crucially, I argue that the generic quantifier is introduced into the structure as a byproduct of the absorption of the agent/cause argument.
